111.32(11)
(11) "Licensing agency" means any board, commission, committee, department, examining board, affiliated credentialing board or officer, except a judicial officer, in the state or any city, village, town, county or local government authorized to grant, deny, renew, revoke, suspend, annul, withdraw or amend any license.
111.32(12)
(12) "Marital status" means the status of being married, single, divorced, separated or widowed.
111.32(12m)
(12m) "Religious association" means an organization, whether or not organized under
ch. 187, which operates under a creed.
111.32(13)
(13) "Sexual harassment" means unwelcome sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors, unwelcome physical contact of a sexual nature or unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature. "Sexual harassment" includes conduct directed by a person at another person of the same or opposite gender. "Unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" includes but is not limited to the deliberate, repeated making of unsolicited gestures or comments of a sexual nature; the deliberate, repeated display of offensive sexually graphic materials which is not necessary for business purposes; or deliberate verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, whether or not repeated, that is sufficiently severe to interfere substantially with an employee's work performance or to create an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment.
111.32(13m)
(13m) "Sexual orientation" means having a preference for heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality, having a history of such a preference or being identified with such a preference.
111.32(13r)
(13r) "Unfair genetic testing" means any test or testing procedure that violates
s. 111.372.
111.32(14)
(14) "Unfair honesty testing" means any test or testing procedure which violates
s. 111.37.
111.32 History
History: 1975 c. 31,
94,
275,
421;
1977 c. 29,
125,
196,
286;
1979 c. 319,
357;
1981 c. 96 s.
67;
1981 c. 112,
334,
391;
1983 a. 36;
1987 a. 149;
1991 a. 117;
1993 a. 107,
427;
1995 a. 27 s.
9130 (4);
1997 a. 3,
112,
283.
111.32 Annotation
Singling out disabilities associated with pregnancy for less favorable treatment in a benefit plan designed to relieve the economic burden of physical incapacity constituted discrimination on the basis of sex as pregnancy is undisputedly sex-linked. Ray-O-Vac v. DILHR,
70 Wis. 2d 919,
236 N.W.2d 209.
111.32 Annotation
"(C)reed", as used in sub. (5) (a), 1979 stats., [now sub. (3m)], means a system of religious beliefs, not political beliefs. Augustine v. Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith,
75 Wis. 2d 207,
249 N.W.2d 547.
111.32 Annotation
Wisconsin law forbidding pregnancy benefits discrimination was not preempted when an employer negotiated, under the National Labor Relations Act, a welfare benefit plan, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. DILHR,
87 Wis. 2d 56,
273 N.W.2d 786 (Ct. App. 1978).
111.32 Annotation
The Fair Employment Act (WFEA) was not preempted by federal legislation. The "future hazards" exception is discussed. Chicago & North Western Railroad v. LIRC,
91 Wis. 2d 462,
283 N.W.2d 603 (Ct. App. 1979).
111.32 Annotation
The inclusion of pregnancy-related benefits within a disability benefit plan does not violate the Equal Pay Act. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. LIRC,
95 Wis. 2d 558,
291 N.W.2d 584 (Ct. App. 1980).
111.32 Annotation
An individual may be found to be handicapped under WFEA although no actual impairment is found. It is sufficient to find that the employer perceived that the individual is handicapped; discrimination may be found when the perceived handicap is the sole basis of a hiring decision. La Crosse Police Commission v. LIRC,
139 Wis. 2d 740,
407 N.W.2d 510 (1987).
111.32 Annotation
Common-law torts recognized before the adoption of WFEA, if properly pled, are not barred by the act although the complained of act may fit a definition of discriminatory behavior under WFEA. A battery claim was not precluded by WFEA, although the sub. (13) definition of "sexual harassment" is broad enough to include battery, when the tort was pled as an unlawful touching, not a discriminatory act. Becker v. Automatic Garage Door Co.
156 Wis. 2d 409,
456 N.W.2d 888 (Ct. App. 1990).
111.32 Annotation
The standard to determine whether a person is an "employee" under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act is applicable to WFEA cases. A determination of "employee" status in a Title VII action precludes redetermination in a WFEA action. Moore v. LIRC,
175 Wis. 2d 561,
499 N.W.2d 288 (Ct. App. 1993), 107.
111.32 Annotation
Barring spouses who are both public employees from each electing family medical coverage is excepted from the prohibition against discrimination based on marital status under ch. 111. Motola v. LIRC,
219 Wis. 2d 589,
580 N.W.2d 297 (1998).
111.32 Annotation
Unwelcome physical contact of a sexual nature and unwelcome verbal conduct or physical conduct of a sexual nature may constitute sexual harassment, even when they do not create a hostile work environment. Jim Walter Color Separations v. LIRC,
226 Wis. 2d 334,
595 N.W.2d 68 (Ct. App. 1999).
111.32 Annotation
A licensing agency may request information from an applicant regarding conviction records under sub. (5) (h), 1979 stats. [now sub. (3)]. 67 Atty. Gen. 327.
111.321
111.321
Prohibited bases of discrimination. Subject to
ss. 111.33 to
111.36, no employer, labor organization, employment agency, licensing agency or other person may engage in any act of employment discrimination as specified in
s. 111.322 against any individual on the basis of age, race, creed, color, disability, marital status, sex, national origin, ancestry, arrest record, conviction record, membership in the national guard, state defense force or any reserve component of the military forces of the United States or this state or use or nonuse of lawful products off the employer's premises during nonworking hours.
111.321 Note
NOTE: See 111.36 for definition of sex discrimination.
111.321 Annotation
The denial of a homosexual employee's request for family coverage for herself and her companion did not violate equal protection or the s. 111.321 prohibition of discrimination on the basis of marital status, sexual orientation, or gender. Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Commission,
167 Wis. 2d 205,
482 N.W.2d 121 (Ct. App. 1992).
111.321 Annotation
A bargaining agreement requiring married employees with spouses covered by comparable employer-provided health insurance to elect coverage under one policy or the other violated this section. Braatz v. LIRC,
174 Wis. 2d 286,
496 N.W.2d 597 (1993).
111.321 Annotation
The exclusive remedy provision in s. 102.03 (2) does not bar a complainant whose claim is covered by the workers compensation act from pursuing an employment discrimination claim under the fair employment act, subchapter II of ch.111. Byers v. LIRC,
208 Wis. 2d 388,
561 N.W.2d 678 (1997).
111.321 Annotation
A prima facie case of discrimination triggers a burden of production against an employer, but unless the employer remains silent in the face of the
prima facie case, the complainant continues to bear the burden of proof on the ultimate issue of discrimination. Currie v. DILHR,
210 Wis. 2d 381,
565 N.W.2d 253 (Ct. App. 1997).
111.321 Annotation
It was reasonable for LIRC to interpret the prohibition against marital status discrimination as protecting the status of being married in general rather than the status of being married to a particular person. Bammert v. LIRC, 2000 WI App 28,
232 Wis. 2d 365,
606 N.W.2d 620.
111.321 Annotation
Licensing boards do not have authority to enact general regulations that would allow them to suspend, deny, or revoke the license of a person who has a communicable disease. Licensing boards do have authority on a case-by-case basis to suspend, deny, or revoke the license of a person who poses a direct threat to the health and safety of other persons or who is unable to perform duties of the licensed activity.
77 Atty. Gen. 223.
111.321 Annotation
A person suffering from a contagious disease may be handicapped pursuant to the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973. School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273 (1987).
111.322
111.322
Discriminatory actions prohibited. Subject to
ss. 111.33 to
111.36, it is an act of employment discrimination to do any of the following:
111.322(1)
(1) To refuse to hire, employ, admit or license any individual, to bar or terminate from employment or labor organization membership any individual, or to discriminate against any individual in promotion, compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment or labor organization membership because of any basis enumerated in
s. 111.321.
111.322(2)
(2) To print or circulate or cause to be printed or circulated any statement, advertisement or publication, or to use any form of application for employment or to make any inquiry in connection with prospective employment, which implies or expresses any limitation, specification or discrimination with respect to an individual or any intent to make such limitation, specification or discrimination because of any basis enumerated in
s. 111.321.
111.322(2m)
(2m) To discharge or otherwise discriminate against any individual because of any of the following:
111.322(2m)(a)
(a) The individual files a complaint or attempts to enforce any right under
s. 103.02,
103.10,
103.13,
103.28,
103.32,
103.455,
103.50,
104.12,
109.03,
109.07,
109.075 or
146.997 or
ss. 101.58 to
101.599 or
103.64 to
103.82.
111.322(2m)(b)
(b) The individual testifies or assists in any action or proceeding held under or to enforce any right under
s. 103.02,
103.10,
103.13,
103.28,
103.32,
103.455,
103.50,
104.12,
109.03,
109.07,
109.075 or
146.997 or
ss. 101.58 to
101.599 or
103.64 to
103.82.
111.322(2m)(d)
(d) The individual's employer believes that the individual engaged or may engage in any activity described in
pars. (a) to
(c).
111.322(3)
(3) To discharge or otherwise discriminate against any individual because he or she has opposed any discriminatory practice under this subchapter or because he or she has made a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this subchapter.
111.322 Annotation
Actions under sub. (1) and (2) do not involving wholly different elements of proof. Sub. (1) involves actual discrimination; the violation of sub. (2) is not in adopting a discriminatory policy, but rather the publication of it. The remaining elements are the same for both subsections. Sub. (2) is not limited to advertising for employees, it also applies to the printing of policies that affect existing employees. Racine Unified School District v. LIRC,
164 Wis. 2d 567,
476 N.W.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1991).
111.322 Annotation
An unlawful practice occurs when an impermissible motivating factor enters into an employment decision, but if the employer can demonstrate that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible factor, the complainant may not be awarded monetary damages or reinstatement. Hoell v. LIRC,
186 Wis. 2d 603,
522 N.W.2d 234 (Ct. App. 1994).
111.322 Annotation
The state is prevented from enforcing discrimination laws against religious associations when the employment at issue serves a ministerial or ecclesiastical function. While it must be given considerable weight, a religious association's designation of a position as ministerial or ecclesiastical does not control its status. Jocz v. LIRC,
196 Wis. 2d 273,
538 N.W.2d 588 (Ct. App. 1995).
111.322 Annotation
The exclusive remedy provision in s. 102.03 (2) does not bar a complainant whose claim is covered by the Workers Compensation Act from pursuing an employment discrimination claim under the Fair Employment Act, subchapter II of ch.111. Byers v. LIRC,
208 Wis. 2d 388,
561 N.W.2d 678 (1997).
111.322 Annotation
A prima facie case of discrimination triggers a burden of production against an employer, but unless the employer remains silent in the face of the
prima facie case, the complainant continues to bear the burden of proof on the ultimate issue of discrimination. Currie v. DILHR,
210 Wis. 2d 381,
565 N.W.2d 253 (Ct. App. 1997).
111.322 Annotation
A prima facie case of a violation of this section requires that the complainant: (1) was a member of a protected class; (2) was discharged; (3) was qualified for the position; and (4) was either replaced by someone not in the protected class or that others not in the protected class were treated more favorably. Knight v. LIRC,
220 Wis. 2d 137,
582 N.W.2d 448 (Ct. App. 1998).
111.322 Annotation
Discrimination in advertising. Abramson, WBB March, 1985.
111.325
111.325
Unlawful to discriminate. It is unlawful for any employer, labor organization, licensing agency or person to discriminate against any employee or any applicant for employment or licensing.
111.33
111.33
Age; exceptions and special cases. 111.33(1)
(1) The prohibition against employment discrimination on the basis of age applies only to discrimination against an individual who is age 40 or over.
111.33(2)
(2) Notwithstanding
sub. (1) and
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of age to do any of the following:
111.33(2)(a)
(a) To terminate the employment of any employee physically or otherwise unable to perform his or her duties.
111.33(2)(b)
(b) To implement the provisions of any retirement plan or system of any employer if the retirement plan or system is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this subchapter. No plan or system may excuse the failure to hire, or require or permit the involuntary retirement of, any individual under
sub. (1) because of that individual's age.
111.33(2)(d)
(d) To apply varying insurance coverage according to an employee's age.
111.33(2)(e)
(e) To exercise an age distinction with respect to hiring an individual to a position in which the knowledge and experience to be gained is required for future advancement to a managerial or executive position.
111.33(2)(f)
(f) To exercise an age distinction with respect to employment in which the employee is exposed to physical danger or hazard, including, without limitation because of enumeration, certain employment in law enforcement or fire fighting.
111.33 History
History: 1981 c. 334;
1983 a. 391,
538.
111.33 Annotation
Sub. (2) (f) exempts the hiring of fire fighters from being the subject of age discrimination suits. A fire department need not show that it openly and consistently discriminated on the basis of age to be exempt under sub. (2) (f). Johnson v. LIRC,
200 Wis. 2d 715,
547 N.W.2d 783 (Ct. App. 1996).
111.33 Annotation
An employee is physically unable to perform a job under sub. (2) if that employee is performing the job with a physical accommodation. Harrison v. LIRC,
211 Wis. 2d 680,
565 N.W.2d 572 (Ct. App. 1997).
111.33 Annotation
A city charged under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act had the burden of establishing that a mandatory retirement age of 55 for law enforcement personnel was a bona fide occupational qualification. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. City of Janesville,
630 F.2d 1254 (1980).
111.33 Annotation
The federal Employment Retirement Income Security Act preempts sub. (2) (b) to the extent that it applies to employee benefit plans covered by it. Waukesha Engine Division v. DILHR,
619 F. Supp. 1310 (1985).
111.335
111.335
Arrest or conviction record; exceptions and special cases. 111.335(1)(a)(a) Employment discrimination because of arrest record includes, but is not limited to, requesting an applicant, employee, member, licensee or any other individual, on an application form or otherwise, to supply information regarding any arrest record of the individual except a record of a pending charge, except that it is not employment discrimination to request such information when employment depends on the bondability of the individual under a standard fidelity bond or when an equivalent bond is required by state or federal law, administrative regulation or established business practice of the employer and the individual may not be bondable due to an arrest record.
111.335(1)(b)
(b) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of arrest record to refuse to employ or license, or to suspend from employment or licensing, any individual who is subject to a pending criminal charge if the circumstances of the charge substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular job or licensed activity.
111.335(1)(c)
(c) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to refuse to employ or license, or to bar or terminate from employment or licensing, any individual who:
111.335(1)(c)1.
1. Has been convicted of any felony, misdemeanor or other offense the circumstances of which substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular job or licensed activity; or
111.335(1)(c)2.
2. Is not bondable under a standard fidelity bond or an equivalent bond where such bondability is required by state or federal law, administrative regulation or established business practice of the employer.
111.335(1)(cg)1.1. Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to deny or refuse to renew a license or permit under
s. 440.26 to a person who has been convicted of a felony and has not been pardoned for that felony.
111.335(1)(cg)2.
2. Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to revoke a license or permit under
s. 440.26 (6) (b) if the person holding the license or permit has been convicted of a felony and has not been pardoned for that felony.
111.335(1)(cg)3.
3. Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to refuse to employ a person in a business licensed under
s. 440.26 or as an employee specified in
s. 440.26 (5) (b) if the person has been convicted of a felony and has not been pardoned for that felony.
111.335(1)(cm)
(cm) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to refuse to employ as an installer of burglar alarms a person who has been convicted of a felony and has not been pardoned.
111.335(1)(cs)
(cs) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to revoke, suspend or refuse to renew a license or permit under
ch. 125 if the person holding or applying for the license or permit has been convicted of one or more of the following:
111.335(1)(cs)1.
1. Manufacturing, distributing or delivering a controlled substance or controlled substance analog under
s. 961.41 (1).
111.335(1)(cs)2.
2. Possessing, with intent to manufacture, distribute or deliver, a controlled substance or controlled substance analog under
s. 961.41 (1m).
111.335(1)(cs)3.
3. Possessing, with intent to manufacture, distribute or deliver, or manufacturing, distributing or delivering a controlled substance or controlled substance analog under a federal law that is substantially similar to
s. 961.41 (1) or
(1m).
111.335(1)(cs)4.
4. Possessing, with intent to manufacture, distribute or deliver, or manufacturing, distributing or delivering a controlled substance or controlled substance analog under the law of another state that is substantially similar to
s. 961.41 (1) or
(1m).
111.335 Annotation
A rule adopted under s. 165.85 properly barred a nonpardoned felon from holding a police job. Law Enforcement Standards Board v. Lyndon Station,
101 Wis. 2d 472,
305 N.W.2d 89 (1981).
111.335 Annotation
A conviction for armed robbery in and of itself constituted circumstances substantially related to a school bus driver's licensure. Gibson v. Transportation Commission,
106 Wis. 2d 22,
315 N.W.2d 346 (1982).
111.335 Annotation
An employer's inquiry is limited to the general facts in determining whether the "circumstances of the offense" relate to the job. It is not the details of the criminal activity, but the circumstances that foster criminal activity, such as opportunity for criminal behavior, reaction to responsibility and character traits of the person, that are important County of Milwaukee v. LIRC,
139 Wis. 2d 805,
407 N.W.2d 908 (1987).
111.335 Annotation
There is no requirement that an that an employer take affirmative steps to accommodate individuals convicted of felonies. Knight v. LIRC,
220 Wis. 2d 137,
582 N.W.2d 448 (Ct. App. 1998).
111.335 Annotation
When evaluating an individual for the position of reserve officer, a sheriff's department may consider information in its possession concerning the individual's juvenile record, subject to prohibitions against arrest record and conviction record discrimination contained in the WFEA.
79 Atty. Gen. 89.
111.335 Annotation
Discrimination in employment on the basis of arrest or conviction record. Mukamel. WBB Sept. 1983.
111.337
111.337
Creed; exceptions and special cases. 111.337(1)(1) Employment discrimination because of creed includes, but is not limited to, refusing to reasonably accommodate an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would pose an undue hardship on the employer's program, enterprise or business.
111.337(2)
(2) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of creed:
111.337(2)(a)
(a) For a religious association not organized for private profit or an organization or corporation which is primarily owned or controlled by such a religious association to give preference to an applicant or employee who is a member of the same or a similar religious denomination.
