940.225 Annotation
Separate acts of sexual intercourse, each different in kind from the others and differently defined in the statutes, constitute separate chargeable offenses. State v. Eisch,
96 Wis. 2d 25,
291 N.W.2d 800 (1980).
940.225 Annotation
The trial court did not err in denying the accused's motions to compel psychiatric examination of the victim and for discovery of the victim's past addresses. State v. Lederer,
99 Wis. 2d 430,
299 N.W.2d 457 (Ct. App. 1980).
940.225 Annotation
The verdict was unanimous in a rape case even though the jury was not required to specify whether the sexual assault was vaginal or oral. State v. Lomagro,
113 Wis. 2d 582,
335 N.W.2d 583 (1983).
940.225 Annotation
A jury instruction that touching the "vaginal area" constituted sexual contact was correct. State v. Morse,
126 Wis. 2d 1,
374 N.W.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1985).
940.225 Annotation
"Unconscious" as used in sub. (2) (d) is a loss of awareness that may be caused by sleep. State v. Curtis,
144 Wis. 2d 691,
424 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1988).
940.225 Annotation
The probability of exclusion and paternity are generally admissible in a sexual assault action in which the assault allegedly resulted in the birth of a child, but the probability of paternity is not generally admissible. HLA and red blood cell test results showing the paternity index and probability of exclusion were admissible statistics. State v. Hartman,
145 Wis. 2d 1,
426 N.W.2d 320 (1988).
940.225 Annotation
Attempted fourth-degree sexual assault is not an offense under Wisconsin law. State v. Cvorovic,
158 Wis. 2d 630,
462 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1990).
940.225 Annotation
The "use or threat of force or violence" under sub. (2) (a) does not require that the force be directed toward compelling the victim's submission, but includes forcible contact or the force used as the means of making contact. State v. Bonds,
165 Wis. 2d 27,
477 N.W.2d 265 (1991).
940.225 Annotation
Convictions under both subs. (1) (d) and (2) (d) did not violate double jeopardy. State v. Sauceda,
168 Wis. 2d 486,
485 N.W.2d 1 (1992).
940.225 Annotation
A defendant's lack of intent to make a victim believe that he was armed was irrelevant in finding a violation of sub. (1) (b); if the victim's belief that the defendant was armed was reasonable, that is enough. State v. Hubanks,
173 Wis. 2d 1,
496 N.W.2d 96 (Ct. App. 1992).
940.225 Annotation
Sub. (2) (d) is not unconstitutionally vague. Expert evidence regarding sleep based solely on a hypothetical situation similar, but not identical, to the facts of the case was inadmissible. State v. Pittman,
174 Wis. 2d 255,
496 N.W.2d 74 (1993).
940.225 Annotation
Convictions under both sub. (2) (a) and (e) did not violate double jeopardy. State v. Selmon,
175 Wis. 2d 155,
877 N.W.2d 498 (Ct. App. 1993).
940.225 Annotation
"Great bodily harm" is a distinct element under sub. (1) (a) and need not be caused by the sexual act. State v. Schambow,
176 Wis. 2d 286, N.W.2d (Ct. App. 1993).
940.225 Annotation
Intent is not an element of sub. (2) (a); lack of an intent element does not render this provision constitutionally invalid. State v. Neumann,
179 Wis. 2d 687,
508 N.W.2d 54 (Ct. App. 1993).
940.225 Annotation
A previous use of force, and the victim's resulting fear, was an appropriate basis for finding that a threat of force existed under sub. (2) (a). State v. Speese,
191 Wis. 2d 205,
528 N.W.2d 63 (Ct. App. 1995).
940.225 Annotation
Violation of any of the provisions of this section does not immunize the defendant from violating the same or another provision in the course of sexual misconduct. Two acts of vaginal intercourse are sufficiently different in fact to justify separate charges under sub. (1) (d). State v. Kruzycki,
192 Wis. 2d 509,
531 N.W.2d 429 (Ct. App. 1995).
940.225 Annotation
For a guilty plea to a sexual assault charge to be knowingly made, a defendant need not be informed of the potential of being required to register as a convicted sex offender under s. 301.45 or that failure to register could result in imprisonment, as the commitment is a collateral, not direct, consequence of the plea. State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6,
232 Wis. 2d 561,
605 N.W.2d 199,
98-2196.
940.225 Annotation
Sub. (2) (g) was not applicable to an employee of a federal VA hospital as it is not a facility under s. 940.295 (2). The definition of inpatient care facility in s. 940.295 incorporates s. 51.35 (1), which requires that all of the specifically enumerated facilities must be places licensed or approved by DHFS. A VA hospital is subject to federal regulation but is not licensed or regulated by the state. State v. Powers, 2004 WI App 156,
276 Wis. 2d 107,
687 N.W.2d 50,
03-1514.
940.225 Annotation
Expert testimony is not required in every case to establish the existence of a mental illness or deficiency rendering the victim unable to appraise his or her conduct under sub. (2) (c). State v. Perkins, 2004 WI App 213,
277 Wis. 2d 243,
689 N.W.2d 684,
03-3296.
940.225 Annotation
The statutory scheme of the sexual assault law does not require proof of stimulation of the clitoris or vulva for finding cunnilingus under sub. (5) (c). The notion of stimulation of the victim offends the principles underpinning the sexual assault law. State v. Harvey, 2006 WI App 26,
289 Wis. 2d 222,
710 N.W.2d 482,
05-0103.
940.225 Annotation
Sub. (2) (h) does not extend to a sheriff's deputy, who was assigned to work as a bailiff in the county courthouse. State v. Terrell, 2006 WI App 166,
295 Wis. 2d 619,
721 N.W.2d 527,
05-1499.
940.225 Annotation
This section criminalizes sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a victim already dead at the time of the sexual activity when the accused did not cause the death of the victim. State v. Grunke, 2008 WI 82, ___ Wis. 2d ___,
752 N.W.2d 769,
06-2744.
940.225 Annotation
The plain language of sub. (3) requires the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants attempted to have sexual intercourse with the victim without the victim's words or overt actions indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse. The state does not have to prove that the victim withheld consent. State v. Grunke, 2008 WI 82, ___ Wis. 2d ___,
752 N.W.2d 769,
06-2744.
940.225 Annotation
One who has sexual contact or intercourse with a dead person cannot be charged with 1st- or 2nd-degree sexual assault, because the facts cannot correspond with the elements of those two charges. However, the possibility that the facts of a particular case will not come within the elements necessary to establish every crime listed in the statute does not mean the statute is absurd, but rather that the evidence necessary for all potential crimes under this section does not exist in all cases. State v. Grunke, 2008 WI 82, ___ Wis. 2d ___,
752 N.W.2d 769,
06-2744.
940.225 Annotation
Sub. (7) does not limit sub. (3) to only those circumstances in which the perpetrator kills and has sexual intercourse with the victim in a series of events, finds no support in the plain language of the statute. State v. Grunke, 2008 WI 82, ___ Wis. 2d ___,
752 N.W.2d 769,
06-2744.
940.225 Annotation
Conviction on 2 counts of rape, for acts occurring 25 minutes apart in the same location, did not violate double jeopardy. Harrell v. Israel,
478 F. Supp. 752 (1979).
940.225 Annotation
A conviction for attempted 1st-degree sexual assault based on circumstantial evidence did not deny due process. Upshaw v. Powell,
478 F. Supp. 1264 (1979).
940.23
940.23
Reckless injury. 940.23(1)(a)(a) Whoever recklessly causes great bodily harm to another human being under circumstances which show utter disregard for human life is guilty of a Class D felony.
940.23(1)(b)
(b) Whoever recklessly causes great bodily harm to an unborn child under circumstances that show utter disregard for the life of that unborn child, the woman who is pregnant with that unborn child or another is guilty of a Class D felony.
940.23(2)(a)(a) Whoever recklessly causes great bodily harm to another human being is guilty of a Class F felony.
940.23(2)(b)
(b) Whoever recklessly causes great bodily harm to an unborn child is guilty of a Class F felony.
940.23 Note
Judicial Council Note, 1988: Sub. (1) is analogous to the prior offense of injury by conduct regardless of life.
940.23 Annotation
Sub. (2) is new. It creates the crime of injury by criminal recklessness. See s. 939.24. [Bill 191-S]
940.23 Annotation
First-degree reckless injury, s. 940.23 (1), is not a lesser included offense of aggravated battery. State v. Eastman,
185 Wis. 2d 405,
518 N.W.2d 257 (Ct. App. 1994).
940.23 Annotation
Sub. (1) (a) cannot be applied against a mother for actions taken against a fetus while pregnant as the applicable definition of human being under s. 939.22 (16) is limited to one who is born alive. Sub. (1) (b) does not apply because s. 939.75 (2) (b) excludes actions by a pregnant woman from its application. State v. Deborah J.Z.
228 Wis. 2d 468,
596 N.W.2d 490 (Ct. App. 1999),
96-2797.
940.23 Annotation
Utter disregard for human life is not a subpart of the intent element and need not be proven subjectively. It can be proven by evidence relating to the defendant's state of mind or by evidence of heightened risk or obvious potentially lethal danger. However proven, utter disregard is measured objectively on the basis of what a reasonable person would have known. State v. Jensen, 2000 WI 84,
236 Wis. 2d 521,
613 N.W.2d 170,
98-3175.
940.235
940.235
Strangulation and suffocation. 940.235(1)
(1) Whoever intentionally impedes the normal breathing or circulation of blood by applying pressure on the throat or neck or by blocking the nose or mouth of another person is guilty of a Class H felony.
940.235(2)
(2) Whoever violates
sub. (1) is guilty of a Class G felony if the actor has a previous conviction under this section or a previous conviction for a violent crime, as defined in
s. 939.632 (1) (e) 1.
940.235 History
History: 2007 a. 127.
940.24
940.24
Injury by negligent handling of dangerous weapon, explosives or fire. 940.24(1)
(1) Whoever causes bodily harm to another by the negligent operation or handling of a dangerous weapon, explosives or fire is guilty of a Class I felony.
940.24(2)
(2) Whoever causes bodily harm to an unborn child by the negligent operation or handling of a dangerous weapon, explosives or fire is guilty of a Class I felony.
940.24 Note
Judicial Council Note, 1988: The definition of the offense is broadened to include highly negligent handling of fire, explosives and dangerous weapons other than a firearm, airgun, knife or bow and arrow. See s. 939.22 (10). The culpable mental state is criminal negligence. See s. 939.25 and the NOTE thereto. [Bill 191-S]
940.24 Annotation
Dogs must be intended to be weapons before their handling can result in a violation of this section. That a dog bites does not render the dog a dangerous weapon. Despite evidence of positive steps to restrain the dog, when those measures are inadequate criminal negligence may be found. Physical proximity is not necessary for a defendant's activity to constitute handling. State v. Bodoh,
226 Wis. 2d 718,
595 N.W.2d 330 (1999),
97-0495.
940.25
940.25
Injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle. 940.25(1)
(1) Any person who does any of the following is guilty of a Class F felony:
940.25(1)(a)
(a) Causes great bodily harm to another human being by the operation of a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.
940.25(1)(am)
(am) Causes great bodily harm to another human being by the operation of a vehicle while the person has a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood.
940.25(1)(b)
(b) Causes great bodily harm to another human being by the operation of a vehicle while the person has a prohibited alcohol concentration, as defined in
s. 340.01 (46m).
940.25(1)(bm)
(bm) Causes great bodily harm to another human being by the operation of a commercial motor vehicle while the person has an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more but less than 0.08.
940.25(1)(c)
(c) Causes great bodily harm to an unborn child by the operation of a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.
940.25(1)(cm)
(cm) Causes great bodily harm to an unborn child by the operation of a vehicle while the person has a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood.
940.25(1)(d)
(d) Causes great bodily harm to an unborn child by the operation of a vehicle while the person has a prohibited alcohol concentration, as defined in
s. 340.01 (46m).
940.25(1)(e)
(e) Causes great bodily harm to an unborn child by the operation of a commercial motor vehicle while the person has an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more but less than 0.08.
940.25(1d)(a)1.1. Except as provided in
subd. 2., if the person who committed an offense under
sub. (1) (a),
(am),
(b),
(c),
(cm), or
(d) has 2 or more prior convictions, suspensions, or revocations, counting convictions under
sub. (1) and
s. 940.09 (1) in the person's lifetime, plus other convictions, suspensions, or revocations counted under
s. 343.307 (1), the procedure under
s. 343.301 shall be followed if the court enters an order regarding operating privilege restriction or enters an order regarding immobilization.
940.25(1d)(a)2.
2. Notwithstanding
par. (b), if the person who committed an offense under
sub. (1) (a),
(am),
(b),
(c),
(cm), or
(d) has 2 or more convictions, suspensions, or revocations counted under
s. 343.307 (1) within any 5-year period, the procedure under
s. 343.301 shall be followed if the court enters an order regarding operating privilege restriction and the installation of an ignition interlock device or enters an order regarding immobilization.
940.25(1d)(b)
(b) If the person who committed an offense under
sub. (1) (a),
(am),
(b),
(c),
(cm), or
(d) has 2 or more prior convictions, suspensions, or revocations, counting convictions under
sub. (1) and
s. 940.09 (1) in the person's lifetime, plus other convictions, suspensions, or revocations counted under
s. 343.307 (1), the procedure under
s. 346.65 (6) shall be followed if the court orders the seizure and forfeiture of the motor vehicle owned by the person and used in the violation.
940.25(1m)(a)(a) A person may be charged with and a prosecutor may proceed upon an information based upon a violation of any combination of
sub. (1) (a),
(am), or
(b); any combination of
sub. (1) (a),
(am), or
(bm); any combination of
sub. (1) (c),
(cm), or
(d); or any combination of
sub. (1) (c),
(cm), or
(e) for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence.
940.25(1m)(b)
(b) If a person is charged in an information with any of the combinations of crimes referred to in
par. (a), the crimes shall be joined under
s. 971.12. If the person is found guilty of more than one of the crimes so charged for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence, there shall be a single conviction for purposes of sentencing and for purposes of counting convictions under
s. 23.33 (13) (b) 2. and
3., under
s. 30.80 (6) (a) 2. or
3., under
ss. 343.30 (1q) and
343.305 or under
s. 350.11 (3) (a) 2. and
3. Subsection (1) (a),
(am),
(b),
(bm),
(c),
(cm),
(d), and
(e) each require proof of a fact for conviction which the others do not require.
940.25(2)(a)(a) The defendant has a defense if he or she proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the great bodily harm would have occurred even if he or she had been exercising due care and he or she had not been under the influence of an intoxicant, did not have a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood, or did not have an alcohol concentration described under
sub. (1) (b),
(bm),
(d) or
(e).
940.25(2)(b)
(b) In any action under this section that is based on the defendant allegedly having a detectable amount of methamphetamine, gamma-hydroxybutyric acid, or delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol in his or her blood, the defendant has a defense if he or she proves by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the incident or occurrence he or she had a valid prescription for methamphetamine or one of its metabolic precursors, gamma-hydroxybutyric acid, or delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol.
940.25 History
History: 1977 c. 193,
272;
1981 c. 20,
184;
1983 a. 459;
1985 a. 331;
1987 a. 399;
1989 a. 105,
275,
359;
1991 a. 277;
1993 a. 317,
428,
478;
1995 a. 425,
436;
1997 a. 237,
295;
1999 a. 32,
109,
186;
2001 a. 16,
109;
2003 a. 30,
97;
2005 a. 253.
940.25 Annotation
The double jeopardy clause was not violated by a charge under sub. (1) (c) [now sub. (1m)] of violations of subs. (1) (a) and (b). State v. Bohacheff,
114 Wis. 2d 402,
338 N.W.2d 466 (1983).
940.25 Annotation
The trial court did not err in refusing to admit expert testimony indicating that the victims would not have suffered the same injury had they been wearing seat belts; the evidence not relevant to a defense under sub. (2). State v. Turk,
154 Wis. 2d 294,
453 N.W.2d 163 (1990).
940.25 Annotation
The offense under sub. (1) (am) has 2 elements that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: 1) the defendant operated a vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood; and 2) the defendant's operation of the vehicle caused great bodily harm to the victim. The elements of the crime do not provide the state with any presumptions that relieves the state of its burden to establish the two elements beyond a reasonable doubt nor did the legislature's enactment, without requiring a causal link between drug use and the injury as an element of the crime, in some way exceeds its authority. State v. Gardner, 2006 WI App 92,
292 Wis. 2d 682,
715 N.W.2d 720,
05-1372.
940.25 Annotation
The affirmative defense under sub. (2) (a) does not shift to the defendant the burden to prove that he or she is innocent. It requires the defendant to prove that despite the fact that the state has satisfied the elements of the offense, the defendant cannot be held legally responsible under the statute. State v. Gardner, 2006 WI App 92,
292 Wis. 2d 682,
715 N.W.2d 720,
05-1372.
940.25 Annotation
"Materially impaired" as used in the definition of "under the influence of an intoxicant" in s. 939.22 (42) does not have a technical or peculiar meaning in the law beyond the time-tested explanations in standard jury instructions. Therefore, the circuit court's response to the jury question to give all words not otherwise defined their ordinary meaning was not error, comported with s. 990.01, and did not constitute an erroneous exercise of discretion. State v. Hubbard, 2008 WI 92, ___ Wis. 2d ___,
752 N.W.2d 839,
06-2753.
940.285
940.285
Abuse of individuals at risk.
