A New York corporation was subject to the long-arm statute when agents of the corporation made two visits to the state in connection with business on which the claim was based. Wisconsin Electrical Manufacturing Co. v. Pennant Products, 619 F.2d 676
The Wisconsin circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction over trust assets in Illinois, making removal to Wisconsin federal district court improper. Norton v. Bridges, 712 F.2d 1156
“Processed" under sub. (4) (b) included a distributor's purchase and sale of goods in the normal course of distribution of those goods. Nelson By Carson v. Park Industries, Inc., 717 F.2d 1120
A buyer's inspection of goods before shipment from the state was sufficient contact for jurisdiction. Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358
An act or omission occurring outside the state with consequences in the state does not fit the tort provisions of sub. (3). Services within the state under sub. (5) do not include the purchase of insurance from a state company. Federated Rural Electric Ins. v. Inland Power & Light, 18 F.3d 389
Specific personal jurisdiction requires that a defendant's contacts with the forum state show that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state or purposefully directed the defendant's activities at the state. This analysis focuses on the defendant's contacts with the forum state itself, not the defendant's contacts with persons who reside there. Deliberate contact with the resident of a state is not the same thing as deliberate contact with the state itself. Lexington Insurance Co. v. Hotai Insurance Co., 938 F.3d 874
Jurisdiction in an action for misrepresentation in the sale of a boat did not exist when the only contact was that the boat would be operated partly in Wisconsin and that the seller wrote a letter to the Wisconsin buyer confirming the already existing contract. McCalla v. A.J. Industries, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 544
The fact that a Virginia corporation was a distributor for a Wisconsin corporation in Virginia is not enough to justify an action in Wisconsin. Watral v. Murphy Diesel Co., 358 F. Supp. 968
A Texas company that ordered a turbine from a Wisconsin manufacturer and sent representatives to Wisconsin twice was subject to Wisconsin jurisdiction. Nordberg Division, Rex Chainbelt, Inc. v. Hudson Engineering Corp., 361 F. Supp. 903
An action for injuries sustained by the plaintiff while using a machine manufactured by the defendant in France and sold to the plaintiff's employer was an action for personal injury based on breach of warranty and strict liability under subs. (4) and (5) (c). Davis v. Mercier-Freres, 368 F. Supp. 498
Service upon a nonresident defendant's father at the father's residence was insufficient for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident, despite claimed actual notice, when no attempt was made to comply with s. 345.09. Chilcote v. Shertzer, 372 F. Supp. 86
The court had jurisdiction over an insurer under sub. (1) (d) based on settlement negotiations conducted by an adjuster, and the insurer was estopped from asserting its no-action clause. Kirchen v. Orth, 390 F. Supp. 313
The court had in-personam jurisdiction by virtue of sub. (5) (b) and (e) when the defendant made initial contact with the plaintiff, sent its president to Milwaukee to solicit the plaintiff's participation in the transaction, delivered documentation of title to the subject property to the plaintiff in Milwaukee, accepted payment in Milwaukee, and executed a lease agreement in Milwaukee. Ridge Leasing Corp. v. Monarch Royalty, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 573
To determine whether a particular nonresident is “doing business" within this state, the court must consider the party's overall activities within the state, past and present, not at some fixed point in time. Modern Cycle Sales, Inc. v. Burkhardt-Larson Co., 395 F. Supp. 587
Actions of out-of-state police officials in continuously soliciting the plaintiff's arrest by a “fugitive from justice notice" entered into an FBI computer data base, representing to Wisconsin authorities that extradition was desired and requesting that the plaintiff be arrested was sufficient minimum contact with Wisconsin to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Maney v. Ratcliff, 399 F. Supp. 760
Infrequent use of Wisconsin roads by an Idaho trucking corporation did not constitute “continuous and systematic" activity necessary to confer jurisdiction under this section. Ladwig v. Trucks Ins. Exch., 498 F. Supp. 161
A foreign corporation is not subject to jurisdiction in Wisconsin when the sole basis for assertion of jurisdiction was unilateral activity of the resident plaintiff. Jadair, Inc. v. Walt Keeler Co., 508 F. Supp. 879
In applying the test under sub. (1) (d), the court looks to the defendant's general contacts with the forum state, not merely its contacts arising out of the specific transaction at issue. Jadair v. Van Lott, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 1141
The defendant's attorney's delivery of checks in the state was insufficient contact to confer jurisdiction under this section. Sed, Inc. v. Bohager/Goodhues, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 196
Contracts for services and contracts for goods are distinguished. L.B. Sales Corp. v. Dial Manufacturing, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 290
A single sale in the state was insufficient contact to confer personal jurisdiction. Uni-Bond, LTD. v. Schultz, 607 F. Supp. 1361
A parent-subsidiary relationship is sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the parent for long-arm purposes so long as the subsidiary carries on sufficient activities in the state. Hayeland v. Jaques, 847 F. Supp 630
This section is intended to reach to the fullest extent allowed under the due process clause. Farby Glove & Mitten Co. v. Spitzer, 908 F. Supp. 625
Foreseeability that the defendant's actions in one state may cause injury in Wisconsin does not amount to causing a local act. The consequences of an act alone do not establish jurisdiction over the defendant under sub. (3). Nelson v. Bulso, 979 F. Supp 1239
In order for solicitation activities to trigger personal jurisdiction the solicitor must anticipate receiving a financial benefit from the activity. Knot Just Beads v. Knot Just Beads, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 932
The fiduciary shield doctrine, which denies personal jurisdiction over an individual whose presence and activity in a state were solely on behalf of an employer or other principal, was not found to be a part of Wisconsin law. Norkol/Fibercore, Inc. v. Gubb, 279 F. Supp. 2d 993
The state may not assert quasi in rem jurisdiction over an insurance company's contractual obligations to defend and indemnify its insured. 64 MLR 374 (1980).
Stacking the deck: Wisconsin's application of Leflar's choice-influencing considerations to torts choice-of-law cases. White. 1985 WLR 401.
Wisconsin's `Stream of Commerce' Theory of Personal Jurisdiction. La Fave. Wis. Law. Nov. 2002.
Personal jurisdiction, grounds for without service of summons.
A court of this state having jurisdiction of the subject matter may, without a summons having been served upon a person, exercise jurisdiction in an action over a person with respect to any counterclaim asserted against that person in an action which the person has commenced in this state and also over any person who appears in the action and waives the defense of lack of jurisdiction over his or her person as provided in s. 802.06 (8)
. An appearance to contest the basis for in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction under s. 802.06 (2) (a) 3.
without seeking any other relief does not constitute an appearance within the meaning of this section.
Sup. Ct. Order, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 596 (1975); 1975 c. 218
; 1993 a. 213
Jurisdiction in rem or quasi in rem, grounds for generally.
A court of this state having jurisdiction of the subject matter may exercise jurisdiction in rem or quasi in rem on the grounds stated in this section. A judgment in rem or quasi in rem may affect the interests of a defendant in the status, property or thing acted upon only if a summons has been served upon the defendant pursuant to s. 801.12
. Jurisdiction in rem or quasi in rem may be invoked in any of the following cases:
When the subject of the action is real or personal property in this state and the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, therein, or the relief demanded consists wholly or partially in excluding the defendant from any interest or lien therein. This subsection shall apply when any such defendant is unknown.
When the action is to foreclose, redeem from or satisfy a mortgage, claim or lien upon real estate within this state.
When the defendant has property within this state which has been attached or has a debtor within the state who has been garnisheed. Jurisdiction under this subsection may be independent of or supplementary to jurisdiction acquired under subs. (1)
When the action is to declare property within this state a public nuisance.
When the action is an action affecting the family under s. 767.001 (1) (a)
and when the residence requirements of s. 767.301
have been met, a court having subject matter jurisdiction may exercise jurisdiction quasi in rem to determine questions of status if the respondent has been served under s. 801.11 (1)
. Notwithstanding s. 801.11 (intro.)
, the court need not have grounds for personal jurisdiction under s. 801.05
in order to make a determination of the status of a marriage under this subsection.
Sup. Ct. Order, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 597 (1975), 758; 1977 c. 418
; 1979 c. 32
s. 92 (4)
; 1979 c. 352
; 1993 a. 213
; 2001 a. 42
; 2005 a. 443
, s. 265
This section requires that in rem actions under s. 161.555 [now s. 961.555] must be commenced against a person having an interest in property seized under s. 161.55 [now s. 961.55]. State v. One 1973 Cadillac, 95 Wis. 2d 641
, 291 N.W.2d 626
(Ct. App. 1980).
For quasi in rem jurisdiction under sub. (5), minimum contacts between the defendant and the state are necessary. Mendez v. Hernandez-Mendez, 213 Wis. 2d 217
, 570 N.W.2d 563
(Ct. App. 1997), 96-1731
Sub. (3) applies when a settlement offer is made at least 20 days before trial. When a dispute is resolved by arbitration there is no trial and sub. (3) does not apply. Lane v. Williams, 2000 WI App 263
, 240 Wis. 2d 255
, 621 N.W.2d 922
It is apparent that the legislature intended to empower the courts with the authority to determine the status of a marriage even if personal jurisdiction over one of the parties is lacking. In adding the final sentence of sub. (5), the legislature chose not to remove the requirement of personal jurisdiction for determinations involving other property or status subject to jurisdiction under this section. Had the legislature intended to remove the requirement of personal jurisdiction for divorce decisions involving property, it could have written the amendment more expansively. Montalvo v. U.S. Title & Closing Services, LLC, 2013 WI App 8
, 345 Wis. 2d 653
, 827 N.W.2d 635
Objection to personal jurisdiction. 801.08(1)(1)
All issues of fact and law raised by an objection to the court's jurisdiction over the person or property as provided by s. 802.06 (2)
shall be heard by the court without a jury in advance of any issue going to the merits of the case. If, after such a hearing on the objection, the court decides that it has jurisdiction, the case may proceed on the merits; if the court decides that it lacks jurisdiction, the defendant shall be given the relief required by such decision.
Factual determinations made by the court in determining the question of personal jurisdiction over the defendant shall not be binding on the parties in the trial of the action on the merits.
No guardian or guardian ad litem may, except as provided in this subsection, waive objection to jurisdiction over the person of the ward. If no objection to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the ward is raised pursuant to s. 802.06 (2)
, the service of an answer or motion by a guardian or guardian ad litem followed by a hearing or trial shall be equivalent to an appearance and waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the ward.
Sup. Ct. Order, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 598 (1975); 1979 c. 110
s. 60 (7)
; Sup. Ct. Order, 101 Wis. 2d xi.
Judicial Council Note, 1981:
The last sentence of sub. (1) has been repealed because it erroneously implied that non-final orders deciding jurisdictional questions were appealable as of right. This has not been true since ch. 187, Laws of 1977 repealed s. 817.33 (3) (f), Wis. Stats. (1975) and created s. 808.03 (1), Wis. Stats. (1977). Heaton v. Independent Mortuary Corp. 97 Wis. 2d 379
, 294 N.W.2d 15
(1980). [Re Order effective July 1, 1981]
A jurisdiction dispute may not be resolved on motion. Merco Distributing Corp. v. O&R Engines, Inc., 71 Wis. 2d 792
, 239 N.W.2d 97
An order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is appealable by permission under s. 808.03 (2). Heaton v. Independent Mortuary Corp., 97 Wis. 2d 379
, 294 N.W.2d 15
An order denying a motion to dismiss based on jurisdiction under sub. (1) is not a final order and is not appealable as of right under s. 808.03 (1). Grulkowski v. DOT, 97 Wis. 2d 615
, 294 N.W.2d 43
(Ct. App. 1980).
The trial court erred in denying plaintiff's request for an evidentiary hearing. The plaintiff has no burden to prove jurisdictional facts prior to a hearing. Henderson v. Milex Products, Inc., 125 Wis. 2d 141
, 370 N.W.2d 291
(Ct. App. 1985).
Conducting pretrial discovery does not constitute “going to the merits of the case" under sub. (1) and does not waive an objection raised under s. 802.06 (2). Honeycrest Farms v. Brave Harvestore Systems, 200 Wis. 2d 256
, 546 N.W.2d 192
(Ct. App. 1996), 95-1789
Summons, contents of.
The summons shall contain:
The title of the cause, specifying the name of the court in which the action is brought, the name of the county designated by the plaintiff as the place of trial, the standardized description of the case classification type and associated code number as approved by the director of state courts and the names and addresses of the parties to the action, plaintiff and defendant.
A direction to the defendant summoning and requiring defendant to serve upon the plaintiff's attorney, whose address shall be stated in the summons, either an answer to the complaint if a copy of the complaint is served with the summons or a demand for a copy of the complaint. The summons shall further direct the defendant to serve the answer or demand for a copy of the complaint within the following periods:
Except as provided in subds. 2.
, within 20 days, exclusive of the day of service, after the summons has been served personally upon the defendant or served by substitution personally upon another authorized to accept service of the summons for the defendant.
If the defendant is the state or an officer, agent, employee, or agency of the state, as to that defendant, within 45 days, exclusive of the day of service, after the summons has been served personally upon the defendant or served by substitution personally upon another authorized to accept service of the summons for the defendant.
Within 45 days, exclusive of the day of service, after the summons has been served personally upon the defendant or served by substitution personally upon another authorized to accept service of the summons for the defendant, if any of the following applies:
Any cause of action raised in the complaint is founded in tort.
Within 40 days after a date stated in the summons, exclusive of such date, if no such personal or substituted personal service has been made, and service is made by publication. The date so stated in the summons shall be the date of the first required publication.
A notice that in case of failure to serve an answer or demand for a copy of the complaint within the time fixed by sub. (2)
, judgment will be rendered against the defendant according to the demand of the complaint. The summons shall be subscribed with the handwritten signature of the plaintiff or attorney with the addition of the post-office address at which papers in the action may be served on the plaintiff by mail, plaintiff's or attorney's telephone number, and, if by an attorney, the attorney's state bar number, if any. If the plaintiff is represented by a law firm, the summons shall contain the name and address of the firm and shall be subscribed with the handwritten signature and state bar number, if any, of one attorney who is a member or associate of such firm. When the complaint is not served with the summons and the only relief sought is the recovery of money, whether upon tort or contract, there may, at the option of the plaintiff, be added at the foot a brief note specifying the sum to be demanded by the complaint.
There may be as many authenticated copies of the summons and the complaint issued to the plaintiff or counsel as are needed for the purpose of effecting service on the defendant. Authentication shall be accomplished by the clerk's placing a filing stamp indicating the case number on each copy of the summons and the complaint.
Sup. Ct. Order, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 598 (1975); Sup. Ct. Order, 67 Wis. 2d viii; 1975 c. 218
; Sup. Ct. Order, 112 Wis. 2d xi; Sup. Ct. Order, 171 Wis. 2d xxv; 1993 a. 365
; 1997 a. 133
; 2001 a. 16
; 2005 a. 442
See s. 802.06 (1)
for provision giving the state 45 days to serve an answer.
Judicial Council Note, 1983: Sub. (2) (a) is amended by applying the extended response time for state officers and agencies to state agents and employees as well. The extended time is intended to allow investigation of the claim by the department of justice to determine whether representation of the defendant by the department is warranted under s. 893.82 or 895.46, Stats. [Re Order effective July 1, 1983]
When a defective summons does not prejudice the defendant, non-compliance with sub. (2) (a) is not jurisdictional error. Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Omark-Prentice Hydraulics, 86 Wis. 2d 369
, 272 N.W.2d 407
(Ct. App. 1978).
Failure to name a party in the summons means that the court has no authority over that party regarding the case. Prejudice need not be shown. Bulik v. Arrow Realty, Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 441
, 434 N.W.2d 853
(Ct. App. 1988).
An unsigned summons served with a signed complaint is a technical defect, which in the absence of prejudice does not deny the trial court personal jurisdiction. Gaddis v. LaCrosse Products, Inc., 198 Wis. 2d 396
, 542 N.W.2d 454
A stamped reproduction of a signature does not satisfy sub. (3), and correcting the signature a year after receiving notice of the defect is not timely under former s. 802.05 (1) (a), 1999 stats. The error must be promptly corrected or else the certification statute and the protection it was intended to afford is rendered meaningless. Novak v. Phillips, 2001 WI App 156
, 246 Wis. 2d 673
, 631 N.W.2d 635
. See also Schaefer v. Riegelman, 2002 WI 18
, 250 Wis. 2d 494
, 639 N.W.2d N.W.2d 715, 00-2157
, reversing the holding of Novak
that the error was technical and not fundamental.
A summons and complaint signed by an attorney not licensed in the state contained a fundamental defect that deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction even though the signature was made on behalf and at the direction of a licensed attorney. Schaefer v. Riegelman, 2002 WI 18
, 250 Wis. 2d 494
, 639 N.W.2d N.W.2d 715, 00-2157
Default judgment entered immediately after the trial court permitted amendment of the pleadings to correct the defendant's name was void because the original summons and complaint named the wrong corporate entity, the defendant's parent. The general rule is that if a misnomer or misdescription does not leave in doubt the identity of the party intended to be sued, or, even when there is room for doubt as to identity, if service of process is made on the party intended to be sued, the misnomer or misdescription may be corrected by amendment at any stage of the suit, and a judgment taken by default is enforceable. However, if the amendment is to bring in a new party, it will be refused. Johnson v. Cintas Corp., 2011 WI App 5
, 331 Wis. 2d 51
, 794 N.W.2d 475
A wholly owned subsidiary of a corporation is a legal entity that exists independently of the parent. The failure to name the subsidiary in a summons and complaint when the subsidiary was the correct party constituted a fundamental defect that precluded the circuit court of personal jurisdiction over the subsidiary, regardless of whether or not the defect prejudiced the subsidiary. It is irrelevant that the summons and complaint was served upon the registered agent for the subsidiary and the subsidiary might have had knowledge that it was meant to be a party. Johnson v. Cintas Corp., 2011 WI App 5
, 331 Wis. 2d 51
, 794 N.W.2d 475
That the plaintiff's publication summons in this case used the updated caption from the amended complaint was of no legal significance. Wisconsin law requires only that the publication summons be substantially in the form detailed in s. 801.095 (4). The updated caption reflected the correct state of the parties at the time of publication and service, and the defendants did not point to any confusion or prejudice they could possibly have suffered by use of an accurate caption, which included each of them, while omitting other persons no longer being pursued in the litigation. Colborn v. Netflix Inc., 541 F. Supp. 3d 888
The summons shall be substantially in one of the forms specified in subs. (1)
. The applicable form depends on the type of service and on whether a complaint is served with the summons, in accordance with s. 801.09
. The forms are:
Personal service; complaint attached.
STATE OF WISCONSIN CIRCUIT COURT: .... COUNTY
City, State Zip Code File No. ....
vs. S U M M O N S
Address .... (Case Classification Type): .... (Code No.)