A defendant is not entitled to sentence credit for the date on which the defendant is sentenced. The statutory language “awaiting imposition of sentence” does not include the date of sentencing because that is the date a defendant's sentence begins. As such, the date of sentencing is counted toward the service of the defendant's sentence. State v. Kontny, 2020 WI App 30
, 392 Wis. 2d 311
, 943 N.W.2d 923
Sub. (1) (b) does not specifically exclude federal holds from sentence credit; it simply explains that sentence credit is available for state probation, extended supervision, and parole holds. Sub. (1) (a) makes clear that the enumeration of “actual days spent in custody” under sub. (1) (a) is not limited to those examples in sub. (1) (b). As the court explained in Gilbert
, 115 Wis. 2d 371
(1983), the clear intent of this section is to grant credit for each day in custody regardless of the basis for the confinement so long as it is connected to the offense for which the sentence is imposed. State v. Thomas, 2021 WI App 59
, 399 Wis. 2d 165
, 963 N.W.2d 927
This section sets a basic rule for sentence credit determinations: a defendant will receive credit for time spent incarcerated when that time has a factual connection to the offense for which the defendant is convicted. The supreme court has repeatedly held that the test under sub. (1) (a) is a factual one. Mere procedural connection is insufficient to warrant sentence credit. State v. Lira, 2021 WI 81
, 399 Wis. 2d 419
, 966 N.W.2d 605
Section 973.10 (2) (b) provides that if a probationer has already been sentenced and the probationer's probation is later revoked, the Department of Corrections shall order the probationer to prison, and the term of the sentence shall begin on the date the probationer enters the prison. Under this unambiguous language, the defendant's imposed-and-stayed sentence did not begin to run until the date the defendant entered prison. It was undisputed that after the defendant's probation in the drug case was revoked, the defendant remained in jail awaiting resolution of charges in an armed robbery case, and the defendant did not enter prison until after he was sentenced on those charges. As such, the defendant did not begin serving the imposed-and-stayed sentence in the drug case until after the defendant was sentenced on the armed robbery charges. Thus, the revocation of the defendant's probation in the drug case did not sever the connection between the defendant's presentence custody and the course of conduct for which the defendant's sentences on the armed robbery charges were imposed. State v. Slater, 2021 WI App 88
, 400 Wis. 2d 93
, 968 N.W.2d 740
The supreme court has long held that, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, or judicial declaration in the sentence imposed, when there is a present sentence for another offense of one then actually or constructively serving a former sentence, the two sentences run concurrently. In this case, in the absence of any evidence that the circuit court intended to impose consecutive sentences, the reviewing court presumed that the sentences were concurrent. State v. Slater, 2021 WI App 88
, 400 Wis. 2d 93
, 968 N.W.2d 740
Jail credit may not be granted if it is not provided for by statute. 71 Atty. Gen. 102
Sentence Credit: More Than Just Math. White. Wis. Law. Oct. 1991.
If an order or judgment releasing a prisoner on habeas corpus is reversed, the time during which the prisoner was at liberty thereunder shall not be counted as part of the prisoner's term.
History: 1993 a. 486
Judgment against a corporation or limited liability company. 973.17(1)(1)
If a corporation or limited liability company fails to appear within the time required by the summons, the default of such corporation or limited liability company may be recorded and the charge against it taken as true, and judgment shall be rendered accordingly.
Upon default of the defendant corporation or limited liability company or upon conviction, judgment for the amount of the fine shall be entered.
A judgment against a corporation or limited liability company shall be collected in the same manner as in civil actions.
History: 1993 a. 112
Notice of restrictions. 973.176(1)(1)
Whenever a court imposes a sentence or places a defendant on probation regarding a felony conviction, the court shall inform the defendant of the requirements and penalties applicable to him or her under s. 941.29 (1m)
Whenever a court imposes a sentence or places a defendant on probation for a conviction that disqualifies the defendant from voting under s. 6.03 (1) (b)
, the court shall inform the defendant in writing that he or she may not vote in any election until his or her civil rights are restored. The court shall use the form designed by the department of corrections under s. 301.03 (3a)
to inform the defendant, and the defendant and a witness shall sign the form.
(3) Child sex offender working with children.
Whenever a court imposes a sentence or places a defendant on probation regarding a conviction under s. 940.22 (2)
or 940.225 (2) (c)
, if the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the offense, a conviction under s. 940.302 (2)
if s. 940.302 (2) (a) 1. b.
applies, or a conviction under s. 948.02 (1)
, 948.025 (1)
, 948.05 (1)
, 948.07 (1)
, or (4)
, or 948.085
, the court shall inform the defendant of the requirements and penalties under s. 948.13
Failure to give the warning under this section does not prevent a conviction under s. 941.29. State v. Phillips, 172 Wis. 2d 391
, 493 N.W.2d 270
(Ct. App. 1992).
Notice of rights to appeal and representation. 973.18(1)(1)
In this section, “postconviction relief" and “sentencing" have the meanings ascribed in s. 809.30 (1)
The trial judge shall personally inform the defendant at the time of sentencing of the right to seek postconviction relief and, if indigent, the right to the assistance of the state public defender.
Before adjourning the sentencing proceeding, the judge shall direct the defendant and defendant's trial counsel to sign a form to be entered in the record, indicating that the lawyer has counseled the defendant regarding the decision to seek postconviction relief, and that the defendant understands that a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief must be filed in the trial court within 20 days after sentencing for that right to be preserved.
The judge shall direct the defendant's counsel to confer with the defendant before signing the form, during the proceeding or as soon thereafter as practicable, and may make appropriate orders to allow the defendant to confer with counsel before being transferred to the state prison. The defendant shall be given a copy of the form.
If the defendant desires to pursue postconviction relief, the defendant's trial counsel shall file the notice required by s. 809.30 (2) (b)
History: Sup. Ct. Order, 123 Wis. 2d xi (1985).
Judicial Council Note, 1984:
Sub. (2) is similar to prior s. 809.30 (1) (b). Subs. (3) and (4) codify State v. Argiz, 101 Wis. 2d 546
, 305 N.W.2d 124
(1981). Sub. (5) codifies trial counsel's continuing duty to provide representation until appellate counsel is retained or appointed. Whitmore v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 706
, 203 NW 2d 56 (1973). [Re order effective July 1, 1985]
Motion to modify sentence. 973.19(1)(a)
A person sentenced to imprisonment or the intensive sanctions program or ordered to pay a fine who has not requested the preparation of transcripts under s. 809.30 (2)
may, within 90 days after the sentence or order is entered, move the court to modify the sentence or the amount of the fine.
Within 90 days after a motion under sub. (1) (a)
is filed, the court shall enter an order either determining the motion or extending the time for doing so by not more than 90 days for cause.
If an order determining a motion under sub. (1) (a)
is not entered timely under sub. (2)
, the motion shall be considered denied and the clerk of the court shall immediately enter an order denying the motion.
An appeal from an order determining a motion under sub. (1) (a)
is governed by the procedure for civil appeals.
By filing a motion under sub. (1) (a)
the defendant waives his or her right to file an appeal or postconviction motion under s. 809.30 (2)
Sup. Ct. Order, 123 Wis. 2d xiv (1985); 1991 a. 39
Judicial Council Note, 1984: This section is intended as an expeditious alternative to the procedure prescribed in s. 809.30 (2) when the only claim for postconviction relief relates to the severity of the sentence. It is not intended to alter the substantive grounds for such relief and it restores the time limits governing such motions prior to the 1978 revision of the appellate rules.
This section will probably be most frequently used in guilty plea cases, although it is not limited to such cases. However, if the defendant intends to withdraw a guilty plea or file other postconviction motions, s. 809.30 (2) or 974.06 provides the appropriate procedure. Motions under this section should usually be filed by trial counsel without the need for transcripts or for appointment of an appellate public defender. A defendant must elect between the remedies provided by this section and s. 809.30 (2). Filing a motion under this section waives relief under s. 809.30 (2). However, a defendant who has filed a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief under s. 809.30 (2) (b) may invoke this remedy at any time before transcripts are ordered under s. 809.30 (2). If transcripts are required for prosecution of a motion under sub. (1) (a), they should be sought under SCR 71.03
Sub. (4) does not expand the scope of appellate review. [Re Order effective July 1, 1985.]
The trial court can, on a motion or on its own motion, modify a criminal sentence if the motion is made within 90 days after sentencing. The first judgment should be amended, not vacated. Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93
, 175 N.W.2d 625
, 46 Wis. 2d 93
(1970), does not impose a jurisdictional limit on the power of a court to review a sentence. Hayes
recognized the inherent power in a trial court to review its sentencing. State ex rel. Warren v. Shawano-Menominee County Court, 54 Wis. 2d 613
, 197 N.W.2d 1
The trial court's increase of the defendant's sentence based solely on “reflection" did not constitute a valid basis for modification of a sentence. There was no “new factor" justifying a more severe sentence, a prerequisite for sentence reevaluation. Scott v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 54
, 218 N.W.2d 350
A reduction in the maximum statutory penalty for an offense is not a “new factor" justifying a postconviction motion to modify the sentence. State v. Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d 544
, 335 N.W.2d 399
There are two alternative means to seek modification of a sentence; proceeding under sub. (1) (a) or (b). Under either, a motion must be first made in the trial court. State v. Norwood, 161 Wis. 2d 676
, 468 N.W.2d 741
(Ct. App. 1991).
Rehabilitation may not be considered as a “new factor" for purposes of modifying an already imposed sentence. State v. Kluck, 210 Wis. 2d 1
, 563 N.W.2d 468
A defendant subject to a post-probation revocation sentence cannot use sub. (1) (b) and s. 809.30 to raise issues that go to the original judgment, but the defendant may take a direct appeal from a subsequent judgment in order to fully litigate issues initially raised by the resentencing. State v. Scaccio, 2000 WI App 265
, 240 Wis. 2d 95
, 622 N.W.2d 449
A circuit court has the inherent power to modify a previously imposed sentence after the sentence has commenced, but it may not reduce a sentence merely upon reflection or second thoughts. A court may do so on the basis of new factors or when it concludes its original sentence was unduly harsh or unconscionable. A court's altered view of facts known to the court at sentencing, or a reweighing of their significance, does not constitute a new factor for sentencing purposes but is mere reflection or second thoughts. State v. Grindemann, 2002 WI App 106
, 255 Wis. 2d 632
, 648 N.W.2d 507
A defendant can seek sentence modification in two ways: 1) moving for modification as a matter of right under this section, to assert an erroneous exercise of discretion based on excessiveness, undue harshness, or unconscionability; or 2) moving for discretionary review, invoking the inherent power of the circuit court, which applies only if a new factor justifying sentence modification exists, in which case, the timeliness requirements of this section are inapplicable. State v. Noll, 2002 WI App 273
, 258 Wis. 2d 573
, 653 N.W.2d 895
A mental health professional who conducted a psychological assessment of a defendant convicted of sexual assault, which was incorporated into the presentence investigation report and admitted into evidence at the sentencing hearing, had a conflict of interest due to the fact that she had treated the victim in the case. The conflict of interest is a new factor justifying the modification of the sentence. State v. Stafford, 2003 WI App 138
, 265 Wis. 2d 886
, 667 N.W.2d 370
The existence of a new factor does not automatically entitle the defendant to relief. The question of whether the sentence warrants modification is left to the discretion of the circuit court. State v. Trujillo, 2005 WI 45
, 279 Wis. 2d 712
, 694 N.W.2d 933
A new factor refers to a fact or set of facts highly relevant to the imposition of sentence, but not known to the trial judge at the time of original sentencing. A reduction in the maximum penalty after sentencing is not highly relevant to the imposition of sentence and does not constitute a new factor. State v. Trujillo, 2005 WI 45
, 279 Wis. 2d 712
, 694 N.W.2d 933
A defendant's substantial and important assistance to law enforcement after sentencing may constitute a new factor that the trial court can take into consideration when deciding whether modification of a sentence is warranted. State v. Doe, 2005 WI App 68
, 280 Wis. 2d 731
, 697 N.W.2d 101
When resentencing based upon a new factor, the court's rationale must clearly reflect the high relevance of the new factor. There must be some connection between the factor and the sentencing, something that strikes at the very purpose for the sentence selected by the trial court. The trial court cannot reduce or increase a sentence upon its reflection that the sentence imposed was harsh or inadequate. State v. Prager, 2005 WI App 95
, 281 Wis. 2d 811
, 698 N.W.2d 837
The circuit court's authority to review its decision to determine whether the sentence it imposed is unduly harsh does not include the authority to reduce a sentence based on events that occurred after sentencing. In deciding whether a sentence is unduly harsh, the circuit court's inquiry is confined to whether it erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion based on the information it had at the time of sentencing. A circuit court's authority to modify a sentence based on events that occurred after sentencing is defined by new factor jurisprudence. Because sexual assault in prison is not a new factor under the case law, the circuit court in this case correctly decided that it did not have the authority to modify the sentence based on the assault. State v. Klubertanz, 2006 WI App 71
, 291 Wis. 2d 751
, 713 N.W.2d 116
When a defendant seeks modification of the sentence imposed at resentencing, this section and s. 809.30 (2) require the defendant to file a postconviction motion with the circuit court before taking an appeal. These rules on sentence modification apply even though the sentence imposed at resentencing is identical to a previous sentence. The rules apply regardless of whether a defendant challenges the original sentence, a sentence after revocation, or the sentence imposed at resentencing. State v. Walker, 2006 WI 82
, 292 Wis. 2d 326
, 716 N.W.2d 498
Once the trial court found that grounds for sentence modification did not exist, particularly with an unrepresented defendant, the trial court should not have converted a motion for sentence modification to a motion for resentencing in the absence of a clear, unequivocal, and knowing stipulation by the defendant. State v. Wood, 2007 WI App 190
, 305 Wis. 2d 133
, 738 N.W.2d 81
A defendant has a due process right to be sentenced based on accurate information. The defendant requesting resentencing must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, both that the information is inaccurate and that the trial court relied upon it. Once a defendant does so, the burden shifts to the state to show that the error was harmless. An error is harmless if there is no reasonable probability that it contributed to the outcome. State v. Payette, 2008 WI App 106
, 313 Wis. 2d 39
, 756 N.W.2d 423
The Department of Correction's determination that an inmate does not meet the placement criteria for the Challenge Incarceration Program under s. 302.045 does not constitute a new factor for purposes of sentence modification when a trial court has determined at sentencing that the defendant is eligible to participate in the program. Once the trial court has made an eligibility determination, the final placement determination is made by the department. Section 302.045 provides that, if an inmate meets all of the program eligibility criteria, the department “may" place that inmate in the program. It is not the sentencing court's function to classify an inmate to a particular institution or program. State v. Schladweiler, 2009 WI App 177
, 322 Wis. 2d 642
, 777 N.W.2d 114
A “new factor" in the context of a motion for sentence modification is a fact or set of facts highly relevant to the imposition of sentence, but not known to the trial judge at the time of original sentencing, either because it was not then in existence or because it was unknowingly overlooked by all of the parties. Frustration of the purpose of the original sentence is not an independent requirement when determining whether a fact or set of facts alleged by a defendant constitutes a new factor. State v. Harbor, 2011 WI 28
, 333 Wis. 2d 53
, 797 N.W.2d 828
The defendant did not show “by clear and convincing evidence that a new factor exists" when asserting that the scientific community recently realized that adolescents are generally impulsive and often have trouble making wise choices, such that the information was a new factor that, if known by the trial court at the time of sentencing, might have resulted in a different parole-eligibility date. Even though the studies proffered may not have been in existence at the time of sentencing, the conclusions reached by the studies were already in existence and well reported by that time. State v. McDermott, 2012 WI App 14
, 339 Wis. 2d 316
, 810 N.W.2d 237
When fruits of a defendant's substantial presentence assistance to law enforcement authorities are not known until after sentencing, those fruits, if highly relevant to the imposition of the sentence in light of the factors set forth in
, 2005 WI App 68
, can constitute a new sentencing factor that the trial court can take into consideration when deciding whether modification of a sentence is warranted. State v. Boyden, 2012 WI App 38
, 340 Wis. 2d 155
, 814 N.W.2d 505
Repeal of a program that previously allowed inmates convicted of certain offenses to earn potential reductions in their terms of initial confinement for defined positive behavior was not a new factor justifying sentence modification when the possibility of positive adjustment time was not a factor highly relevant to the sentence imposed. State v. Carroll, 2012 WI App 83
, 343 Wis. 2d 509
, 819 N.W.2d 343
A postsentencing report that expresses an opinion different from that of the trial court regarding the objectives of sentencing (protection, punishment, rehabilitation, and deterrence) is nothing more than a challenge to the trial court's discretion and does not constitute a new factor for sentence modification purposes. State v. Sobonya, 2015 WI App 86
, 365 Wis. 2d 559
, 872 N.W.2d 134
An error in imposing a parole eligibility date rather than an extended supervision eligibility date was not a new factor that warranted modifying the defendant's sentence. State v. Barbeau, 2016 WI App 51
, 370 Wis. 2d 736
, 883 N.W.2d 520
Sentence adjustment. 973.195(1g)(1g)
In this section, “applicable percentage" means 85 percent for a Class C to E felony and 75 percent for a Class F to I felony.
Except as provided in s. 973.198
, an inmate who is serving a sentence imposed under s. 973.01
for a crime other than a Class B felony may petition the sentencing court to adjust the sentence if the inmate has served at least the applicable percentage of the term of confinement in prison portion of the sentence. If an inmate is subject to more than one sentence imposed under this section, the sentences shall be treated individually for purposes of sentence adjustment under this subsection.
The inmate's conduct, efforts at and progress in rehabilitation, or participation and progress in education, treatment, or other correctional programs since he or she was sentenced.
A change in law or procedure related to sentencing or revocation of extended supervision effective after the inmate was sentenced that would have resulted in a shorter term of confinement in prison or, if the inmate was returned to prison upon revocation of extended supervision, a shorter period of confinement in prison upon revocation, if the change had been applicable when the inmate was sentenced.
The inmate is subject to a sentence of confinement in another state or the inmate is in the United States illegally and may be deported.
Sentence adjustment is otherwise in the interests of justice.
Upon receipt of a petition filed under par. (a)
, the sentencing court may deny the petition or hold the petition for further consideration. If the court holds the petition for further consideration, the court shall notify the district attorney of the inmate's petition. If the district attorney objects to adjustment of the inmate's sentence within 45 days of receiving notification under this paragraph, the court shall deny the inmate's petition.
If the sentence for which the inmate seeks adjustment is for an offense under s. 940.225 (2)
, 948.02 (2)
, or 948.085
, and the district attorney does not object to the petition within 10 days of receiving notice under par. (c)
, the district attorney shall notify the victim, as defined under s. 950.02 (4)
, of the inmate's petition. The notice to the victim shall include information on the sentence adjustment petition process under this subsection, including information on how to object to the inmate's petition. If the victim objects to adjustment of the inmate's sentence within 45 days of the date on which the district attorney received notice under par. (c)
, the court shall deny the inmate's petition.
Notwithstanding the confidentiality of victim address information obtained under s. 302.113 (9g) (g) 3.
, a district attorney who is required to send notice to a victim under par. (d)
may obtain from the clerk of the circuit court victim address information that the victim provided to the clerk under s. 302.113 (9g) (g) 3.
If the sentencing court receives no objection to sentence adjustment from the district attorney under par. (c)
or the victim under par. (d)
and the court determines that sentence adjustment is in the public interest, the court may adjust the inmate's sentence as provided under par. (g)
. The court shall include in the record written reasons for any sentence adjustment granted under this subsection.
Except as provided under par. (h)
, the only sentence adjustments that a court may make under this subsection are as follows:
If the inmate is serving the term of confinement in prison portion of the sentence, a reduction in the term of confinement in prison by the amount of time remaining in the term of confinement in prison portion of the sentence, less up to 30 days, and a corresponding increase in the term of extended supervision.
If the inmate is confined in prison upon revocation of extended supervision, a reduction in the amount of time remaining in the period of confinement in prison imposed upon revocation, less up to 30 days, and a corresponding increase in the term of extended supervision.
If the court adjusts a sentence under par. (g)
on the basis of a change in law or procedure as provided under par. (b) 3.
and the total sentence length of the adjusted sentence is greater than the maximum sentence length that the offender could have received if the change in law or procedure had been applicable when the inmate was originally sentenced, the court may reduce the length of the term of extended supervision so that the total sentence length does not exceed the maximum sentence length that the offender could have received if the change in law or procedure had been applicable when the inmate was originally sentenced.